Author Avv. Salvatore Aprigliano | published on September 16, 2026

What the pending EU case could mean for Italian citizenship by descent beyond the second generation and for people affected by Article 3-bis.

Before the 2025 Tajani Reform, Italian citizenship by descent (jure sanguinis) could be recognized through very remote Italian ancestors, provided the citizenship line had been legally transmitted without interruption.

There was no general statutory generational limit.

That changed in March 2025, when Decree-Law No. 36/2025, commonly called the Tajani Decree, was later converted into Law No. 74/2025. Article 3-bis of Law No. 91/1992 introduced a far more restrictive system for people born abroad who also hold another citizenship. The rule applies even to people born before the reform and states that, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies, they are “considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship.”

That retroactive effect is now before the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-816/26, Picuso. The CJEU has been asked to interpret Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU and decide whether EU law permits the Article 3-bis mechanism to operate in this way.

The CJEU has not yet ruled.

But its answer could have major consequences for people who would have qualified for Italian citizenship by descent under the rules that existed before the 2025 reform.

Key Takeaways

• Italy remains primarily responsible for deciding who acquires Italian citizenship.
• But Italian citizenship also carries EU citizenship, so national citizenship powers may be subject to EU-law limits.
• Under the pre-2025 framework, Italian citizenship by descent was treated as a status acquired at birth where the legal line of transmission existed.
• Article 3-bis now provides that certain people born abroad are “considered never to have acquired” Italian citizenship, even if they were born before the reform.
• The Italian Constitutional Court formally describes Article 3-bis as an original bar to acquisition, not a loss or revocation of citizenship.
• Earlier CJEU cases such as Tjebbes, Udlændinge and Stadt Duisburg establish strong safeguards where Member-State citizenship, and therefore EU citizenship, is lost.
• Whether those safeguards apply in the same way to Article 3-bis remains unresolved.
• Filing now and waiting for Picuso do not involve the same risks. Neither option guarantees the outcome.

 

1. Can EU law override the Tajani Decree?

Potentially, yes.

Italian citizenship remains a matter primarily governed by Italian law. The European Union does not decide, person by person, who should become an Italian citizen. But national citizenship law does not always operate entirely outside EU law.

Why does EU law matter to Italian citizenship?

Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU establish EU citizenship. Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU provide that every national of an EU Member State is also a citizen of the European Union, and that EU citizenship is additional to national citizenship rather than replacing it.

There is therefore no separate application for “European citizenship.” If you are an Italian citizen, you are also an EU citizen. And where Italian citizenship is the person’s only nationality from an EU Member State, losing it also means losing EU citizenship.

That matters because EU citizenship carries important rights, including freedom of movement and residence within the European Union and political and consular rights established by the Treaties.

So Italy remains competent to regulate Italian citizenship. But where the exercise of that power affects EU citizenship, EU law can become relevant.

What power does the CJEU actually have?

The Court of Justice of the European Union, or CJEU, is the final authority on the interpretation of EU law.

Through the preliminary-ruling procedure, national courts can ask the CJEU to clarify what EU law requires. The CJEU does not normally decide the entire national case. It answers the European-law question, the national court then applies that answer to the dispute before it.

The CJEU explains what EU law means. The national court applies that interpretation to the case.

For an American reader, the closest functional analogy is the relationship between state law and higher federal law. The European Union is not the United States, so the systems are not institutionally identical. But the analogy helps explain the basic point: a national rule can continue to exist formally while a court is prevented from applying it where higher applicable law requires a different result.

What happens when Italian law conflicts with EU law?

When an Italian citizenship case falls within the scope of EU law, EU law takes priority over conflicting national law. If an Italian rule conflicts with applicable EU law, the national judge must leave the conflicting Italian rule unapplied. The classic CJEU judgment Simmenthal established that national courts must ensure the full effectiveness of directly applicable EU rules and, where necessary, leave conflicting national legislation unapplied without waiting for the legislature or a constitutional court to remove it.

That does not mean the CJEU deletes Article 3-bis from Law No. 91/1992. The legal consequence is more precise. If binding and applicable EU law prevents Article 3-bis from operating in a particular situation, the national court must give effect to EU law in that case.

If Article 3-bis cannot be applied, what happens next?

The applicant does not automatically receive Italian citizenship.

The judge would still have to determine whether the person qualifies under the legal framework that applies without the incompatible Article 3-bis obstacle.

Under the pre-2025 system, citizenship by descent was not subject to the general generational restriction introduced by the Tajani Reform.

The applicant would still need to establish a valid Italian ancestor, the relevant family line, legal transmission through the generations, and the absence of a legally relevant interruption.

So the possible consequence of a favorable CJEU ruling is not: “Everyone excluded by Tajani automatically becomes Italian.”

Certain applicants could once again have their citizenship claims assessed under the pre-2025 rules.

 

Subscribe to our newsletter!

 

2. Italian citizenship by descent at birth, and why retroactivity matters

Before the 2025 reform, when was citizenship by descent acquired?

At birth, where the legal conditions for transmission were satisfied.

The Italian Supreme Court’s Joint Sections reaffirmed the structure of iure sanguinis citizenship again in Judgment No. 24045/2026. Giving “total continuity” to its 2022 case law, the Court stated that citizenship acquired by birth is acquired originally iure sanguinis and that, once acquired, the status is permanent, imprescriptible and enforceable at any time upon proof of the relevant acquisition and transmission facts.

The later recognition by a consulate, municipality or court therefore did not create citizenship at that later date. It determined whether the person had already acquired that status from birth.

In legal terms, the recognition process was therefore declaratory rather than constitutive of citizenship.

The citizenship came first. The recognition came later.

A person could therefore qualify as an Italian citizen from birth even without ever having held an Italian passport or previously obtaining formal recognition.

Did the Tajani Reform abolish citizenship at birth?

Not exactly. Article 1 of Law No. 91/1992 still states that the child of an Italian father or mother is a citizen by birth. But Article 3-bis expressly operates in derogation from Article 1 and several other citizenship provisions.

For people falling within its scope, Article 3-bis says that a person born abroad, including before the reform, who also possesses another citizenship is “considered never to have acquired Italian citizenship” unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.

That is legally different from saying: “You acquired citizenship and then lost it.” Article 3-bis deliberately uses a different construction. And that difference is now one of the central issues in the EU-law debate.

Why is the phrase “considered never to have acquired” so important?

• The person was born abroad before 2025.
• The person would have qualified under the pre-2025 rules.
• The person holds another citizenship.
• No Article 3-bis exception applies.

Under the previous legal framework, the analysis began by asking whether citizenship arose at birth through a valid line of transmission. Article 3-bis now directs the legal system to treat that person as though Italian citizenship had never been acquired.

The person’s birth did not change. The family line did not change. What changed was the legal rule applied to that already-existing factual history.

That is why retroactivity is so important. But one distinction must remain clear: Article 3-bis itself does not call this loss or revocation, and the Italian Constitutional Court has so far refused to describe it that way.

 

3. Judgment No. 63/2026, Order No. 147/2026 and the CJEU Picuso case

Did Judgment No. 63/2026 approve the entire Tajani Reform?

No.

The Constitutional Court decides the specific constitutional questions brought before it. Judgment No. 63/2026 rejected the questions raised in that particular proceeding. It did not declare that every possible legal issue concerning Article 3-bis had been resolved.

A clear example appears in paragraph 9.1. The Court expressly left unresolved the situation of people who had already started the citizenship-recognition process but had not received a qualifying consular appointment before the March 27, 2025 deadline, because that issue was outside the case before it.

So Judgment 63 was a major decision. But it was not a general constitutional “seal of approval” for every aspect of the reform.

What did Judgment No. 63 say about people affected by Article 3-bis?

The Court acknowledged that citizenship status arises at birth. But for people born abroad it placed major weight on the fact that the status had not yet been formally ascertained.

The Court said that Article 3-bis did not affect positions already consolidated through recognition, a protected application or a qualifying appointment and considered the status of the remaining recipients not legally certain.

From this reasoning, the Constitutional Court characterized Article 3-bis as an “original bar to acquisition” rather than as revocation or loss.

That distinction is crucial. Most of the strongest CJEU safeguards developed so far involve people who clearly possessed national citizenship and then lost it. Article 3-bis is formally built differently.

Did Order No. 147/2026 mean that the Constitutional Court changed its mind?

Not formally.

Order No. 147/2026 did not withdraw Judgment 63. On the contrary, the Constitutional Court repeated its earlier characterization of Article 3-bis as an “original bar to acquisition of Italian citizenship” and not a revocation.

The Court also stated that it still considered its earlier judgment consistent with previous CJEU case law.

So Order 147 should not be described as an admission that Judgment 63 was wrong.

In Judgment No. 63/2026, the Constitutional Court declined to make a preliminary reference because it considered the existing CJEU case law sufficiently clear to resolve the EU-law issue without asking Luxembourg.

In Order No. 147/2026, the Court formally maintained that reasoning, but nevertheless decided to refer the question, invoking the principle of sincere cooperation and the CJEU’s authority to give the definitive interpretation of EU law.

That creates an important tension. If the answer had remained as clear as the Court considered it in Judgment No. 63, there would have been less reason to seek a preliminary ruling. Order No. 147 therefore does not expressly reverse Judgment No. 63, but it shows that the EU-law issue could no longer simply be treated as closed at national level.

That referral created Case C-816/26, Picuso.

The official CJEU case record confirms that Picuso reaches Luxembourg as a preliminary-ruling case concerning Union citizenship, originating from the Italian Constitutional Court.

What exactly has the CJEU been asked to decide in Picuso C-816/26?

The formal question is more precise than simply asking: “Is the Tajani Reform retroactive?”

Constitutional Court asked whether Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU preclude national legislation such as Article 3-bis insofar as it creates an original bar to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for people born abroad, including before the provision entered into force, who possess another citizenship and do not satisfy one of the statutory exceptions.

The official CJEU case materials now provide additional detail about the legal context in which that question reaches Luxembourg. The formal preliminary question remains framed under Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU and presents Article 3-bis as an “original bar” to the acquisition of Italian citizenship for people born abroad, including before the reform entered into force. The case materials also record broader arguments raised in the national proceedings concerning proportionality, effective protection, free movement and Charter rights. Those arguments help explain the legal context of the dispute, but they are not separate questions formally referred to the CJEU.

The retroactive effect on people already born under the previous system is therefore central to Picuso.

But the CJEU receives the question in the legal form chosen by the Constitutional Court: non-acquisition, not formal loss.

What is Picuso?

Picuso is CJEU Case C-816/26, a pending preliminary-ruling case concerning EU citizenship and originating from the Italian Constitutional Court. The CJEU must determine what Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU require in relation to the Article 3-bis mechanism described in that referral.

It will not rewrite Italian citizenship law, will not itself decide every individual citizenship case. It will interpret EU law. Italian courts must then apply that interpretation.

What is formally before Picuso, and what is not?

Formally before the CJEU	Not yet decided
Article 3-bis and the “original bar to acquisition” described by Order 147	Whether every generational limit is contrary to EU law
People born abroad, including before the reform	Whether Tjebbes safeguards automatically apply to Article 3-bis
People who also possess another citizenship	The outcome of every individual citizenship case
Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU	Every other possible EU-law issue arising from the Tajani Reform
The mechanism including the statutory exceptions	Whether any future citizenship reform would comply with EU law
Formally before the CJEU	Broader legal context / not a separate referred question
Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU are the formal Treaty provisions referred to the CJEU	Charter rights, proportionality, effective judicial protection and free-movement arguments form part of the broader legal context but are not separate questions formally referred

Picuso is therefore extremely important. But Luxembourg is not being asked to decide every conceivable question concerning Italy’s citizenship reform.

4. What previous CJEU citizenship cases tell us

Has the CJEU already decided a case identical to Article 3-bis?

No.

Several CJEU cases establish strong principles concerning national citizenship and EU citizenship. But none is factually identical to the mechanism created by Article 3-bis. The most developed line concerns loss of citizenship.

Rottmann: national citizenship powers are not immune from EU law

In Rottmann, C-135/08, Germany revoked a naturalization obtained through fraud. Because the revocation could also lead to the loss of EU citizenship, the CJEU held that national citizenship powers had to be exercised consistently with EU law and the principle of proportionality.

Rottmann did not prohibit Member States from revoking citizenship. It established the broader principle that Member-State competence over nationality must respect EU law where Union citizenship is affected.

Tjebbes: automatic loss cannot necessarily be the final word

Tjebbes, C-221/17 concerned Dutch legislation under which certain dual nationals could automatically lose Dutch citizenship after ten uninterrupted years outside the Netherlands and the European Union.

The Dutch system also gave the person a way to preserve the citizenship. During that period, obtaining a Dutch passport, identity card or nationality certificate restarted the ten-year clock.

The CJEU accepted that a Member State could in principle establish an automatic-loss mechanism based on maintaining a genuine connection with the State. But the automatic operation of the law could not necessarily end the EU-law analysis.

National authorities or courts had to be able to review the consequences of the loss for the individual and, where appropriate, restore nationality with retroactive effect.

Why Tjebbes matters to the Tajani debate

Under Tjebbes, citizenship clearly existed first. The individual had years in which to protect it. Relatively simple acts could preserve the status. EU law still required the possibility of proportionality review.

Article 3-bis works differently because Italy says the affected person is considered never to have acquired citizenship. Whether that formal difference changes the EU-law analysis remains unresolved.

 

Subscribe to our newsletter!

 

Udlændinge: the opportunity to protect citizenship must be real

Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, C-689/21 concerned a woman born in the United States who had Danish and U.S. nationality from birth. Danish law provided that certain people born abroad could lose Danish nationality automatically at age 22.

The CJEU made clear that simply creating a formal possibility to act before loss is not enough. The individual must have a genuine opportunity to protect the status.

That includes a reasonable period and proper information about the possible loss, the right to seek review and the relevant deadline.

Stadt Duisburg: effective access, information and individual assessment

The same line was reinforced in Stadt Duisburg, Joined Cases C-684/22 to C-686/22.

The CJEU accepted that German law could provide for automatic loss of national citizenship when another nationality was voluntarily acquired. But EU-law compatibility depended on safeguards.

The individuals had to have effective access, within a reasonable period, to a retention procedure; they had to be adequately informed; and the system had to allow an individual proportionality assessment.

Where those safeguards were missing, national authorities or courts had to be able to conduct that review later and, where appropriate, restore citizenship ex tunc.

In the loss-of-nationality cases decided so far, the CJEU has required important safeguards, including an effective opportunity to protect the status and an individual proportionality review of the consequences of the loss.

Those cases are highly relevant to the Tajani debate, but they do not yet answer the specific question raised by Article 3-bis. Whether, and to what extent, the same EU-law protections apply to a rule characterized by Italy as “non-acquisition” remains unresolved.

The real question is whether, in Italian citizenship-by-descent cases, “loss” and “non-acquisition” are truly different legal situations, or whether they are simply two different labels for essentially the same result.

What about EU law on acquiring citizenship rather than losing it?

This is where Commission v Malta, C-181/23, matters.

The factual context was completely different. Malta operated an investor-naturalization program in which nationality could essentially be granted in exchange for predetermined payments or investments.

The CJEU held that Member States retain broad powers to establish conditions for granting nationality, but that those powers, like their powers over loss, are not unlimited under EU law.

The significance of Malta should not be exaggerated. It does not decide Italian citizenship by descent. It does not automatically transfer the Tjebbes individual-assessment rule to every case involving acquisition.

But it does establish an important proposition: EU-law scrutiny of Member-State citizenship powers is not confined exclusively to cases formally labeled as loss.

That is one reason the loss/non-acquisition distinction in Picuso is so important, but not necessarily the end of the analysis.

5. What does Picuso mean for pending Italian citizenship cases?

Are all pending cases automatically suspended?

No.

The Picuso referral does not automatically suspend every Italian citizenship case.

Different judges may manage pending proceedings differently. Some may formally suspend the case. Others may postpone hearings or adjourn the decision. Others may conclude that the dispute before them can be resolved without waiting for the CJEU.

The Constitutional Court suspended its own proceedings. That does not create a nationwide procedural freeze.

There is no automatic nationwide suspension, but Picuso can materially affect the timing and management of cases in which Article 3-bis is decisive.

Can an Italian judge decide a case before Picuso?

Yes, in principle.

The existence of a pending preliminary reference elsewhere does not automatically prevent another national court from deciding its own case.

Existing CJEU citizenship law also remains part of the legal framework. But an important uncertainty remains: the existing loss cases do not directly decide whether Article 3-bis must be treated according to the same standards despite Italy’s characterization of it as non-acquisition.

Different judges may therefore approach the issue differently while Picuso remains pending.

What happens if a citizenship case is appealed?

A first-instance rejection does not necessarily end the case if the judgment is appealed within the applicable deadline. A timely appeal prevents the first-instance judgment from becoming final immediately and keeps the case pending before the appellate court unless and until the appeal itself is concluded.

In practice, a number of first-instance courts have already chosen to suspend or adjourn citizenship cases while waiting for the CJEU’s answer in Picuso. That is an emerging procedural practice, not a nationwide rule, and different judges may still proceed differently.

If Picuso is decided while the appeal is still pending, the appellate court must take into account any relevant and binding CJEU interpretation of EU law.

A pending appeal is therefore not in the same procedural position as a case that has already become final. But a pending appeal does not guarantee that Picuso will benefit the applicant. The eventual European ruling must still be relevant to that case, and the underlying citizenship requirements must still be satisfied.

How long could Picuso take?

There is no official judgment date.

There is no official timetable for Picuso. As a general benchmark, preliminary-ruling proceedings completed by the Court of Justice in 2025 took an average of 16.9 months. Individual cases can take more or less time depending on their procedural course.

Preliminary-ruling proceedings can vary depending on the written stage, whether the Court holds a hearing, whether an Advocate General delivers an Opinion and the complexity of the legal questions.

Applicants should therefore think in terms of many months rather than weeks.

 

 

6. Who could benefit from the CJEU Picuso ruling, and should you file now or wait?

Who could benefit from a favorable ruling?

Potentially, the effects could extend beyond the original cases behind Order No. 147/2026.

The CJEU interprets EU law. Its interpretation is not confined only to the parties who were involved in the original Constitutional Court proceedings.

If Picuso concludes that the Article 3-bis mechanism cannot operate in the way challenged in the referral, that interpretation could become relevant in other pending Italian cases raising the same EU-law issue.

The most immediate group would therefore be applicants whose cases are already pending.

But people who have not yet filed could also potentially rely on the CJEU principle later, provided that their situation falls within the scope of the ruling and they otherwise qualify under the applicable citizenship rules.

The difference between those two groups is not simply whether they might eventually qualify. It is also timing and procedural position.

Should you file now or wait for Picuso?

There is no universally safer answer.

Waiting reduces one kind of uncertainty. Filing before Picuso addresses a different kind of risk.

Why someone may decide to wait

• Know the CJEU’s interpretation before committing to litigation.
• Avoid present litigation costs.
• Make the decision with more legal information.

For many people, those are substantial advantages.

Why someone may decide to file before Picuso

A person who files before the CJEU judgment may already have a pending judicial proceeding when that judgment arrives.

If Picuso is favorable and relevant to the case, the Italian judge must apply the binding EU-law interpretation to that pending dispute.

That places the applicant in a different procedural position from someone who has never filed.

This distinction matters because citizenship legislation can contain transitional rules that differentiate between people according to the steps already taken before a legal change. Article 3-bis itself did exactly that: the 2025 reform preserved the previous rules for certain people who had already filed judicial claims, filed qualifying administrative applications or obtained qualifying appointments by March 27, 2025.

That does not mean that filing a case now guarantees protection from any future law. No one can promise that.

But it demonstrates an important legal reality: when citizenship rules change, procedural timing can matter.

Someone who waits for Picuso is therefore not choosing an option without risk. The person is choosing to obtain greater certainty about the European judgment while accepting uncertainty about what the Italian legal framework may look like later.

The real comparison

Legal uncertainty now versus timing uncertainty later.

Filing before Picuso may make sense for someone who clearly qualifies under the pre-2025 rules, accepts the cost and uncertainty of litigation today, and considers it important to have an already-pending claim if Picuso is favorable.

Waiting may make sense for someone who prefers to know the CJEU result first, does not want to litigate under an unsettled legal framework, and accepts the possibility that the law, procedures or timing environment may change while waiting.

Neither choice guarantees the outcome.

Could a favorable Picuso ruling trigger a new wave of Italian citizenship cases?

Potentially, yes.

That possibility should not be exaggerated. But it is relevant when considering timing.

A favorable Picuso ruling could affect several groups at approximately the same time: applicants whose Article 3-bis cases are already pending; people who would have qualified under the pre-2025 rules but have decided to wait for Luxembourg; and some applicants who postponed action because another citizenship issue previously appeared to prevent their claim.

The Minor Age issue is one example. In Judgment No. 24045/2026, the Supreme Court’s Joint Sections clarified, in the historic statutory context before it, that a child who had acquired Italian citizenship at birth and another citizenship by ius soli did not lose Italian citizenship merely because the Italian parent subsequently naturalized while the child was still a minor.

That removed a significant obstacle under the pre-reform framework. For some families, however, Article 3-bis now creates a separate problem.

A favorable Picuso ruling could therefore lead some applicants who had postponed litigation for different reasons to reconsider their position at the same time.

Why could timing matter?

Italian courts have finite capacity.

If a substantial number of people decide to wait for the same European ruling and then begin proceedings after a favorable judgment, demand could increase.

No one can reliably predict how large such an increase would be, and no one can predict the reaction of every Italian court.

Waiting for Picuso may reduce legal uncertainty while potentially placing an applicant in a later and more crowded wave of filings if the judgment is favorable.

There is also relevant historical context. The Government’s official explanatory materials for the 2025 reform referred to the scale of potential citizenship claims and the pressure generated for consulates, municipalities and courts.

The reform was then introduced through an emergency decree-law with a cutoff tied to procedural steps already taken by March 27, 2025.

That history does not tell us what Parliament or the Government will do after Picuso. A future legislative change is not certain. No change at all is also possible.

The narrower conclusion is the one that matters: waiting means waiting not only for a judgment, but inside a legal system that can continue to change.

Would a favorable Picuso ruling immediately reopen consular applications?

Not necessarily in practice.

A CJEU interpretation binds national authorities within the scope of EU law. But legal effect and administrative implementation do not always occur at the same speed.

Italian courts can apply a binding CJEU interpretation to cases before them. Consulates and municipalities may need operational guidance explaining how a major judgment affects existing administrative procedures, particularly if Article 3-bis formally remains in the statute book.

A favorable judgment could have immediate legal significance without producing identical administrative practice across all offices on the same day.

 

Subscribe to our newsletter!

 

7. What could happen after the CJEU rules on Italian citizenship?

What are the possible outcomes in Picuso?

Scenario 1: the CJEU accepts the Article 3-bis mechanism

The CJEU could conclude that Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU do not prevent Article 3-bis from operating in the manner described by the Constitutional Court.

That would resolve the EU-law question within the scope of Picuso in Italy’s favor. It would not automatically resolve every remaining question under the Italian Constitution.

Scenario 2: the CJEU finds the mechanism incompatible with EU law

The Court could instead conclude that EU law prevents Article 3-bis from operating in the way challenged.

Italian courts would then have to give effect to that interpretation. Where necessary, the conflicting national rule could not be applied in cases falling within the scope of the CJEU judgment.

Those citizenship claims could then have to be assessed under the legal framework applicable without that Article 3-bis obstacle.

The exact effect of a favorable CJEU ruling would depend on what the Court actually decides. It could remove the Article 3-bis obstacle for affected applicants, or require Italy to apply the rule differently.

Scenario 3: the CJEU accepts the objective but requires additional safeguards

The outcome does not necessarily have to be entirely binary.

The Court could consider the objective of the national reform legitimate while concluding that EU law requires additional safeguards before the mechanism can produce its full effects.

• effective opportunity;
• reasonable time;
• adequate information;
• proportionality review.

But those safeguards were principally developed in cases involving loss of nationality.

Whether Picuso extends, adapts or distinguishes that case law is still an open question.

These are possible outcomes, not predictions.

Would a favorable Picuso ruling automatically grant Italian citizenship?

No.

Picuso concerns the EU-law obstacle. It does not replace the underlying citizenship analysis.

• the Italian ancestor;
• the complete line of descent;
• lawful transmission from generation to generation;
• absence of a legally relevant interruption;
• and any other historical requirement affecting the family line.

A favorable Picuso ruling could reopen the path. It would not remove the need to qualify.

What happens after the CJEU judgment?

The proceedings referred by the Constitutional Court return to that Court. Order No. 147/2026 expressly suspended the constitutional proceedings pending the answer from Luxembourg.

After the CJEU rules, the Constitutional Court will resume those proceedings and complete its review in light of the European interpretation.

The CJEU answers the EU-law question. The Constitutional Court then completes the Italian constitutional case.

Other Italian courts with cases in which the CJEU interpretation is relevant may also have to apply that interpretation to their pending proceedings.

What if the CJEU rules in Italy’s favor?

That would resolve the European question referred in Picuso. It would not necessarily terminate every aspect of the Italian constitutional proceedings.

The Constitutional Court could still have to address domestic constitutional questions that remain properly before it.

EU law and the Italian Constitution are two distinct legal layers.

Would an unfavorable Picuso judgment settle every EU-law issue concerning the Tajani Reform?

Not necessarily.

It would settle the issue actually decided by the CJEU. Under Article 267 TFEU, a national court may request a preliminary ruling where an interpretation of EU law is necessary for the dispute before it.

A different future case could theoretically raise a genuinely distinct EU-law question not already resolved by Picuso. That does not mean another reference will necessarily happen. The point is simply that any CJEU judgment must be read according to its actual scope.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can the CJEU cancel the Tajani Decree?

No. The CJEU does not repeal Italian legislation. It interprets EU law. If that interpretation prevents Article 3-bis from being applied in certain situations, Italian courts and authorities must give effect to EU law within that scope.

Is Article 3-bis still in force?

Yes. Order No. 147/2026 did not suspend Article 3-bis throughout Italy. The Constitutional Court suspended the proceedings before it while awaiting the CJEU ruling.

Has Picuso already decided that the Tajani Reform violates EU law?

No. Case C-816/26 is pending. The CJEU has not yet ruled on Article 3-bis.

Is Picuso deciding whether Italy can ever impose a generational limit?

No. The formal question concerns the Article 3-bis mechanism applied to people born abroad, including before the reform, who possess another citizenship and do not fall within the statutory exceptions. Picuso should not be described as a general ruling on every possible generational restriction.

Does Tjebbes already prove that Article 3-bis violates EU law?

No. Tjebbes, Udlændinge and Stadt Duisburg establish important protections in cases involving loss of national citizenship and EU citizenship. Article 3-bis is formally characterized by Italy as non-acquisition. Whether the same standards apply is one of the unresolved issues.

Are Italian courts automatically suspending every citizenship case?

No. There is no automatic nationwide rule requiring every pending citizenship case to stop. Individual courts may suspend, adjourn or decide depending on the case and the issues before them.

Should I file now or wait?

There is no universally correct answer. Waiting gives the applicant more certainty about what the CJEU will decide. Filing creates an already-pending proceeding before that ruling arrives. The choice therefore depends on eligibility, cost, procedural position, timing and tolerance for uncertainty.

Would a favorable Picuso ruling automatically make me an Italian citizen?

No. It could remove or change the Article 3-bis obstacle. The applicant would still have to satisfy the citizenship requirements that otherwise apply.

Final Takeaway

The real issue in Picuso is not whether the European Union can simply take control of Italian citizenship law. It cannot.

The question is whether Italy can use Article 3-bis to treat certain people born abroad, including people already born before the 2025 reform, as though they never acquired Italian citizenship, consistently with the EU-law rules governing European citizenship. The answer is not yet known.

Existing CJEU case law contains strong safeguards where national citizenship is lost. Italy describes Article 3-bis as non-acquisition. Whether that distinction is decisive, or whether EU law also looks at the substance and practical effect of the rule, is now for the CJEU to clarify.

Waiting may reduce uncertainty about the CJEU judgment. It does not eliminate uncertainty about what the legal landscape will look like when the waiting ends.

Primary Legal Sources

• Law No. 91/1992 — Article 3-bis (Normattiva)
• Articles 9 TEU, 20 TFEU and 267 TFEU (EUR-Lex)
• Italian Constitutional Court — Judgment No. 63/2026
• Italian Constitutional Court — Order No. 147/2026
• Italian Supreme Court, Joint Sections — Judgment No. 24045/2026
• CJEU — Rottmann, C-135/08
• CJEU — Tjebbes, C-221/17
• CJEU — Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, C-689/21
• CJEU — Stadt Duisburg, Joined Cases C-684/22 to C-686/22
• CJEU — Commission v Malta, C-181/23
• CJEU — Case C-816/26, Picuso — official case record and request for a preliminary ruling 

Legal information notice This article provides general legal information concerning a developing area of Italian and European Union citizenship law. It is not a prediction of the CJEU’s judgment and does not replace an individual assessment of a person’s citizenship eligibility or procedural position.