Can Italy retroactively take away Italian Citizenship acquired at birth?

Is the 2025 Tajani Reform retroactive?

Yes. Article 3-bis of Italian Citizenship Law No. 91/1992 expressly applies to certain people born abroad before the new rule entered into force and, unless an exception applies, considers them as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship.

The retroactivity is not an interpretation added later. It is built into the law itself.

Does being born before the Tajani Reform protect you from the new Italian Citizenship Law?

No, not by itself. The Tajani Reform was expressly written to reach certain people who were already born when the law changed. Being born before 2025 does not, on its own, preserve the previous Italian citizenship rules.

That leads to the harder question at the center of this article: can a new law retroactively change the legal consequences of citizenship that arose at birth under the previous law?

Born before the Tajani Reform: why March 27, 2025 can change the legal result

Two people could have been born on the very same day, under exactly the same Italian citizenship law, and both would have been regarded as Italian citizens from birth under the rules then in force. Yet the Tajani Reform can now treat them differently based on what happened by March 27, 2025.

If one had taken one of the steps protected by Article 3-bis by March 27, the previous rules can still apply. If the other had not, Article 3-bis can consider that person as having never acquired Italian citizenship, unless another statutory exception applies.

Same day of birth. Same citizenship law at birth. Two different legal outcomes decades later.

That is the retroactivity problem in its clearest form.

Under the previous Italian Law, when was Italian Citizenship by Descent acquired?

At birth. Under the Italian citizenship rules and case law applicable before the Tajani Reform, citizenship by descent was acquired through birth and filiation when the legal requirements were met. A later consular or court proceeding established that status; it did not create citizenship only from the date of recognition.

Under the Tajani Reform, is Italian Citizenship by Descent still acquired at birth?

Yes. Italian citizenship by descent is still acquired at birth for people who meet the requirements for recognition. But the Tajani Reform retroactively changed who is considered as having acquired it.

Some people can still be recognized as Italian citizens from birth. Others, despite having been born under the previous citizenship rules, are now considered as having never acquired Italian citizenship at all.

For some people, the difference turns on steps taken by March 27, 2025. Yet before that date, no Tajani rule had told them that acting by March 27 would become decisive for whether they would continue to be considered Italian citizens from birth.

The new rule came later.

What did Italy’s Constitutional Court say about Tajani Reform retroactivity?

The Italian Constitutional Court expressly recognized that Article 3-bis is retroactive. In Judgment No. 63/2026, it described the provision as an “exemplary case” of true retroactivity because it changes, with effect from the past, the legal consequences produced under the previous citizenship rules.

The same judgment recognizes that, under those previous rules, Italian citizenship by descent was acquired through filiation. Yet the Court did not characterize Article 3-bis as taking away citizenship already acquired. Instead, it described the new rule as an “original bar” to acquisition.

The debate is not whether the Tajani Reform is retroactive. The Constitutional Court says that it is. The debate is about what the law does retroactively.

How can Citizenship acquired at birth be retroactively considered “never acquired”?

The Constitutional Court’s reasoning turns on recognition. In plain English, before formal recognition a descendant effectively had what could be described as “potential citizenship”: the claim came from birth, but the legal requirements still had to be verified through a consulate or a court. Once verified, the person was recognized as having been an Italian citizen from birth.

The Tajani Reform changed that equation retroactively. If citizenship had not yet been formally established, Article 3-bis can now prevent recognition under the previous rules and consider the person instead as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship.

That is why Judgment No. 63/2026 can describe the reform as both truly retroactive and an “original bar” rather than a loss or revocation.

 

Can a retroactive Citizenship Law set a deadline that had already passed?

According to the Italian Constitutional Court, the Tajani mechanism can operate that way.

The original decree was introduced on March 28, 2025. Yet some protections under Article 3-bis depend on steps already taken by March 27, the day before.

In this sense, the Tajani Reform is retroactive twice.

First, it reaches back to births that occurred under the previous citizenship rules. Second, it gives new legal consequences to whether certain actions had been taken by a deadline that had already expired when the new rule arrived.

No one could have learned from the Tajani Reform that they needed to act by March 27 because the reform did not yet exist. The Constitutional Court nevertheless found that the change was not “absolutely unforeseeable.”

But foreseeability is not the same as notice. Knowing that Italian citizenship law might change is not the same as being told what you must do, by what date, and being given a reasonable time to do it.

Does EU Law require prior notice and a reasonable time to protect your Citizenship?

Yes, in cases involving the loss of citizenship. In Udlændinge (C-689/21) and Stadt Duisburg (Joined Cases C-684/22 to C-686/22), the CJEU developed safeguards requiring, in the relevant circumstances, an effective opportunity to protect citizenship status, adequate information, a reasonable period to act and effective access to the relevant procedure.

At first sight, that might seem to answer the Tajani Reform problem. It does not.

The reason is technical but crucial. Article 3-bis does not formally say: you acquired Italian citizenship and we are now taking it away. It says that certain people must be considered as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship.

So the EU-law question is harder: do safeguards developed for the loss of citizenship also apply when a Member State retroactively characterizes the status as never having been acquired?

That question has not yet been answered.

A warning raised before Judgment No. 63/2026

Professor Enrico Grosso identified this problem during an April 2025 hearing before the Italian Senate. He argued that describing the reform as retroactive “non-acquisition” rather than loss risked becoming what he called a “truffa delle etichette,” a “fraud of labels.” His point was simple: if the previous law gave a person citizenship at birth, saying later that the person must be considered as never having acquired it may change the label without necessarily changing the substantive effect.

Why is the Tajani Reform now before the EU Court of Justice?

Because the key question is no longer simply what Italian law says. It is whether EU law allows Italy to do what the Tajani Reform does retroactively.

Italy can make its own citizenship laws, but when EU law applies those national rules must comply with it. For a U.S. reader, the easiest analogy is federal law: a state has its own lawmaking powers, but it cannot apply state law in a way that conflicts with controlling federal law. The European Union is not a federal state, so the comparison is not exact, but the basic idea is similar.

Italian citizenship matters at EU level because an Italian citizen is also a citizen of the European Union. A change in Italian citizenship law can therefore affect EU citizenship and the rights attached to it.

That is why the issue did not end with the Italian Constitutional Court. The authoritative interpretation of EU law belongs to the CJEU. In July 2026, the Constitutional Court referred the EU-law question to Luxembourg. The case is C-816/26, Picuso.

Put simply, the CJEU is being asked whether EU law allows Italy to apply the Tajani Reform retroactively to people born before the reform and consider them as having never acquired Italian citizenship.

What exactly will the CJEU decide in the Picuso case?

The official question asks whether EU law permits Article 3-bis to create an “original bar” to acquiring Italian citizenship even for certain people born before the new law entered into force.

In plain English, the question is whether Italy can apply the Tajani Reform retroactively and consider those people as having never acquired Italian citizenship.

But the referral leaves an important issue open. Will the CJEU focus only on whether this retroactive “non-acquisition” is compatible with EU law? Or will it also consider whether treating citizenship acquired at birth as if it had never been acquired is, in substance, a loss of citizenship?

We do not know yet. The Constitutional Court did not expressly ask the CJEU to reclassify Article 3-bis as a loss. But the distinction matters because EU law already contains important safeguards for citizenship loss.

Picuso could therefore clarify not only the limits of retroactive citizenship laws, but also whether “never acquired” and “lost” are legally different for EU-law purposes.

Will the CJEU’s Picuso ruling apply the same way to every Italian Citizenship case?

Not necessarily. Picuso does not have to produce an automatic result in which everyone affected by the Tajani Reform either wins or loses.

The CJEU interprets EU law and sets principles that national courts must follow. It could uphold the retroactive mechanism, reject it, or take an intermediate approach by requiring safeguards before it can be applied. A reasonable period to act is one possible example.

That uncertainty is why the way an Italian citizenship case is built and argued can still matter. If Picuso establishes principles rather than one automatic outcome, Italian judges may still have to apply those principles to the facts, evidence and legal arguments in each case.

Picuso may set the European rules. Italian judges may still have to decide how those rules apply case by case.

Should you wait for the CJEU’s Picuso ruling before filing an Italian Citizenship case?

There is no single answer that applies to everyone. Picuso may not deliver a simple “everyone wins” or “everyone loses” ruling. The CJEU could uphold the retroactive rule, limit it, require safeguards, or establish principles that Italian judges must apply individually.

The legal landscape could also change before Picuso is decided. Italian citizenship law could be amended again, new Italian or European decisions could clarify particular issues, and individual cases may raise questions that Picuso does not fully answer.

That is why the first question may not be “Should I file before or after Picuso?” The more fundamental question is: “Do I want to pursue recognition of my Italian citizenship?”

If the answer is yes, the individual case should be assessed on its own facts. A lawyer can evaluate the family history, evidence, any steps taken before the Tajani Reform, the law currently in force and the legal arguments available, and advise on whether, when and how to proceed.

Picuso is part of that assessment, not the answer to it. Today, the Tajani Reform remains in force. A future CJEU ruling could change how Article 3-bis must be interpreted or applied, but it may do so by setting principles rather than one automatic result.

The CJEU may define the European rules. The Italian judge may still have to decide what those rules mean for your case.

 

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Frequently Asked Questions

Is the Tajani Reform still in force while Picuso is pending before the CJEU?

Yes. The Tajani Reform remains in force while Case C-816/26, Picuso, is pending. The CJEU referral did not repeal or automatically suspend Article 3-bis.

That does not mean every Italian citizenship case must stop and wait. The judge hearing each case decides whether to suspend the proceedings or move forward, depending on the issues that must be decided in that case.

Picuso is pending. The Tajani Reform remains in force. Whether an individual case waits for Luxembourg is a separate question for the judge hearing that case.

If I was born before the Tajani Reform, does the new Italian Citizenship Law apply to me?

Potentially, yes. Being born before the Tajani Reform does not, by itself, protect you from Article 3-bis. The law expressly reaches certain people born before it entered into force.

Whether it affects you depends on your circumstances and on whether a statutory exception applies. The separate EU-law question is whether Italy can lawfully give Article 3-bis that retroactive effect.

If my Italian Citizenship was already recognized before the Tajani Reform, can it be taken away?

No. The Tajani Reform does not revoke Italian citizenship that had already been formally recognized before the new rules took effect.

Article 3-bis works differently. It applies retroactively to certain people whose Italian citizenship by descent had not yet been recognized and considers them as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies.

So the retroactivity controversy discussed in this article is not about the Tajani Reform taking citizenship away from people who had already obtained formal recognition. It concerns people who, under the previous rules, acquired Italian citizenship at birth but had not yet obtained formal recognition when the law changed.

Does it matter if I had already started the Italian Citizenship process before March 27, 2025?

Yes. It can make the difference between the Tajani Reform applying retroactively to your citizenship and the previous Italian citizenship rules continuing to apply.

Article 3-bis expressly creates exceptions to its retroactive “never acquired” rule. In particular, the previous rules remain applicable in the situations protected by the law, including qualifying citizenship applications, court cases and consular appointments connected to the March 27, 2025 cutoff.

If your case falls within one of those statutory exceptions, this is a situation in which the retroactive “never acquired” rule does not apply. Your citizenship can instead be recognized under the previous rules, as citizenship acquired at birth.

The important question is therefore not simply whether you had “started” the process, but whether what you had done by March 27, 2025 falls within one of the exceptions protected by Article 3-bis.

Did I acquire Italian Citizenship at birth if it was never formally recognized?

Yes, under the Italian citizenship rules that applied before the Tajani Reform, if the legal requirements for citizenship by descent were met. Formal recognition established that status; it did not make citizenship begin only on the recognition date.

Under the Tajani Reform, however, Article 3-bis can retroactively consider certain people as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship, unless an exception applies.

Whether EU law permits that retroactive result is now part of the controversy before the CJEU in Picuso. In the meantime, Italian judges continue to decide the cases before them on their facts and legal arguments.

Was I supposed to apply for Italian Citizenship before March 27, 2025?

No. Before the Tajani Reform, there was no general rule requiring a person who had acquired Italian citizenship by descent at birth to obtain formal recognition by March 27, 2025 in order to preserve that status.

The date became legally decisive only after it had already passed. The new rules were introduced on March 28, but Article 3-bis protects certain applications, court cases and qualifying consular appointments tied to March 27.

In that sense, the Tajani Reform is retroactive twice: it reaches back to earlier births, and it gives new legal consequences to a deadline that had already expired.

Has the CJEU previously dealt with a retroactive loss of Citizenship like the Tajani Reform?

Not in the CJEU cases relevant here. The leading citizenship-loss cases involved rules that gave people advance warning and time to act.

Tjebbes (C-221/17) is a striking example. The Dutch rule was not retroactive in the way the Tajani Reform is. It provided a ten-year period before citizenship could be lost automatically, and people could interrupt that period by taking steps to maintain citizenship.

Even then, the CJEU required the possibility of reviewing the individual consequences under EU law and, where necessary, restoring citizenship with retroactive effect.

The open question is different. The Tajani Reform does not formally take citizenship away; it retroactively considers certain people as having never acquired it. Do the safeguards developed for citizenship loss also apply to this retroactive “non-acquisition”?

Are retroactive “Non-Acquisition” and loss of Citizenship really different?

That is one of the key questions that remains open.

Legally, they are described differently. Loss means that a person acquired citizenship and later lost it. Article 3-bis uses a different construction: certain people born abroad are retroactively considered as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship.

But some constitutional law scholars argue that the difference is more formal than substantive. Professor Enrico Grosso told the Italian Senate in April 2025 that the people affected had acquired Italian citizenship at birth under the previous law. In his view, retroactively considering them as never having acquired it produces, in substance, the loss of a status they already possessed.

Grosso called this a “truffa delle etichette,” a “fraud of labels”: changing the legal characterization from “loss” to “non-acquisition” does not necessarily change the substantive effect.

Whether EU law will treat that distinction as decisive is still open.

Has the CJEU already ruled that people must be given notice and time before losing Citizenship?

Yes. In citizenship-loss cases, the CJEU has required, in the relevant circumstances, an effective opportunity to protect citizenship status, including adequate information and a reasonable period in which to act.

In Udlændinge (C-689/21) and Stadt Duisburg (Joined Cases C-684/22 to C-686/22), the Court developed safeguards concerning notice, a reasonable opportunity to act and effective access to procedures for protecting citizenship status.

The contrast with the Tajani Reform is striking: even the relevant deadline works retroactively. Some protections under Article 3-bis depend on steps taken by March 27, 2025, but the new restrictions were introduced on March 28, after that date had already passed.

People were therefore not first told what they needed to do and then given time to do it. The new rule came later and made what they had, or had not, done by the previous day legally decisive.

The crucial difference is that Udlændinge and Stadt Duisburg concerned loss of citizenship, while Article 3-bis formally speaks of retroactive non-acquisition. Whether that distinction changes the EU-law protections is still open.

The key question about Tajani Reform retroactivity is still open

One point is clear: the 2025 Tajani Reform is retroactive. The Italian Constitutional Court itself has said so. Article 3-bis reaches people born before the reform and can consider them as having “never acquired” Italian citizenship, even though citizenship by descent was acquired at birth under the previous rules.

What remains unresolved is whether EU law allows Italy to produce that retroactive effect.

The CJEU already has a well-developed line of cases on loss of citizenship. Those cases establish important safeguards under EU law, including, depending on the circumstances, adequate information, a reasonable opportunity to protect citizenship status and proportionality review.

The Tajani Reform uses a different legal construction. Italy does not formally take citizenship away. Article 3-bis retroactively considers certain people as having never acquired it.

If the CJEU accepts that retroactive “non-acquisition” is legally different from loss, Picuso enters relatively new territory. But if the CJEU concludes that the Tajani Reform produces the substantive equivalent of a loss of citizenship, Article 3-bis would have to be measured against safeguards the CJEU has already established for citizenship loss.

A mechanism that operates retroactively, without prior notice, without giving those affected a reasonable period to protect their status and without the safeguards required by that case law would be difficult to reconcile with those established EU-law principles.

So the central question may ultimately be remarkably simple: can Italy avoid the EU-law rules governing the loss of citizenship by defining the same substantive effect as citizenship that was “never acquired”?

That is the question Luxembourg has yet to answer.